Suchergebnisse

Chancengerechtigkeit ist ein zentraler Bestandteil unserer Erwartungen an eine demokratische Gesellschaft. Dies gilt auch für den Arbeitsmarkt: Dieser Wochenbericht untersucht anhand von Befragungsdaten des European Social Survey 2018 (ESS), wie die europäischen Bürgerinnen und Bürger ihre Chancen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ihrer Heimatländer einschätzen und welche Faktoren auf gesellschaftlicher und individueller Ebene dabei eine Rolle spielen. Etwa ein Drittel der Befragten ist skeptisch, was die allgemeine Chancengerechtigkeit auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in ihrem Land betrifft. Die eigenen Chancen schätzt immerhin die Hälfte der Befragten als gerecht ein. Sowohl die allgemeinen als auch die eigenen Chancen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt werden im Norden Europas etwas positiver bewertet als im Süden. Ohnehin benachteiligte Gruppen beurteilen auch ihre Arbeitsmarktchancen weniger positiv. Insgesamt zeigt sich ein klarer Zusammenhang zwischen der wahrgenommenen Changengerechtigkeit und der Zufriedenheit mit der Demokratie im eigenen Land.

The objective of this paper is to explain populist attitudes that are prevailing in a number of European democracies. Populist attitudes expectedly lead to social protests and populist votes. We capture the populist wave by relying not on voting behavior but rather on values that are traditionally viewed as populist values, such as distrust of institutions and neighbors, rejection of migrations and strong preferences for law and order. Our study covers the period 2004 to 2018 and 25 European countries for which we match aggregated indicators of populist values and social polarization computed from ESS and SILC survey micro-data, respectively. We find that social polarization, along with other factors, can explain populist attitudes. We also observe that both populist attitudes and polarization vary across countries much more than over time, with the exception of authoritarian values which appear positively correlated with social polarization, particularly among baby-boomers and younger cohorts. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Chapter 1: "Instrumentalism" and Friedman's Methodology: A Short Objection -- Chapter 2: A Sort of Paretian Liberalism -- Chapter 3: Liberty, Equality, and Impossibility: Some General Results in the Space of "Soft" Preferences -- Chapter 4: The Arrow Paradox with Fuzzy Preferences -- Chapter 5: Equality, Priority, and Distributional Judgements -- Chapter 6: Two Logical and Normative Issues Relating to Measurement in the Social Sciences -- Chapter 7: Social Groups and Economic Poverty: A Problem in Measurement -- Chapter 8: Reckoning Sub-Group Poverty Differentials in the Measurement of Aggregate Poverty -- Chapter 9: Poverty Measurement in the Presence of a "Group Affiliation Externality" -- Chapter 10: Revisiting the Normalization Axiom in Poverty Measurement -- Chapter 11: The Focus Axiom and Poverty: On the Co-existence of Precise Language and Ambiguous Meaning in Economic Measurement -- Chapter 12: Assessing Inequality in the Presence of Growth -- Chapter 13: Revisiting an Old Theme in the Measurement of Inequality and Poverty -- Chapter 14: Inequality Measurement with Subgroup Decomposability and Level-Sensitivity.5500 |s| |a|Behavioral economics.

Most contemporary work on public spheres tends to adopt, either explicitly or implicitly, Habermas's idea of a deliberative public sphere as a normative model. There are, however, a number of other normative models available that are rarely the subject of empirical scrutiny: republican, liberal and multicultural. This article poses the empirical question of whether actually existing public spheres more closely resemble one model rather than another. To answer this question, the authors develop ways to measure public spheres, at both national and transnational level. They ground this attempt to move comparative media analysis forward conceptually and empirically via a case study comparing media content about the EU Constitution in six countries.

The EU spends more than one billion euros per year, translating and interpreting, to preserve multilingualism. We examine how this budget should be fairly allocated, taking into account linguistic and economic realities of each member country. Our analysis helps to estimate the value of keeping English as a procedural language (in fact, almost a lingua franca) in the post-Brexit EU, where just about one percent of its population will have it as native language. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published